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ABSTRACT 
Since the World Trade Organization (WTO) was se1 up, an11dumping laws have become a more and more popular measure for resolving 
trade disputes among ,is members. The anlidumping law has been a vital 1001 for every country lO fight against predatory pncing by 
foreign compames in order to prolecl domestic industry However, anlidumping can be one form of protecuonism. which nurtures 
ineffic ient industnes as well as increasi ng costs lo domestic consumers. 11 also creates impediments lo free trade and disregards 
comparative advantages ln particular. antidumping is controversial because ii is quite difficult lO distinguish whether or no! there is a 
genuine action against dumping or just trade discrimination II is necessary for the interested parties 10 clearly understand what 1s real 
dumping and antidumping. How 10 response antidumpmg charges? How 10 pro1ec1 their own imerests in the anudumping litiga11ons? 
How to av01d being a main target of anlidumping acuons? 
ln this paper, I will try 10 find the proper answers to all the above questions. I will also focus on analyzmg the charactenstics of the 
antidumping hugauons against China because China has become the main 1arge1 of mos! anlidumping lawsuits ,n the world 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents pages, abstract, footnotes and references) 
comprises 12281 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
With the development of the worldwide economy, non-tariff barriers to trade and free 
competition have became comparatively important issues. However, faced with the 
need to deal with the negative consequences of trade liberalization, countries do need 
some safeguards to protect some sensitive domestic industries from foreign 
competition. Therefore, antidumping actions are designed to be the temporary means 
to offset unfair competition in international trade. 
1 Unfortunately, in practice, 
contrary to its design, this trade defense measure actually has been used as a 
long-term remedy for resolving various economic difficulties relating to international 
trade. Even worse, if antidumping actions are abused or misused they can impose 
more serious restrictions on international trade and create additional obstacles. As a 
result, this will be opposite to its original purpose and lead to international trade 
discrimination. 
Therefore, the current situation urgently calls for some research attention to improve 
the understanding about: what is real dumping and antidumping? How to respond to 
antidumping charges? How to protect the interests in the antidumping litigations? 
How to avoid being a main target of antidumping actions? 
China has been the major target of antidumping investigations in recent years.2 The 
statistics indicate that one-in-six anti-dumping cases involved Chinese products.
3 On 
the other hand, for imports, China is one of the smallest users of antidumping 
1 Jason Z. Yin, Ling Li Antidu111ping War and Northeast Asian Economies (NEAE):lssues and 
S1racegic Op1ions (PHD Research Paper Department of Management Hong Kong Polytechnic 
University, 2002) 
2 <http://www.sis-verlag.de/03 I 027/stel/DUMP _ WH.HTM> (last accessed 19 October 2003) 
The WTO Secretariat reported that during the period I January - 30 June 2003, 18 Members initiated 
79 anti-dumping investigations against exports from a total of 30 different countries or customs territories. 
China. with 12 investigations on its exports, still remains at the top of the list of countries subject to 
anti-dumping investigations. 
3 <http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAU52433.htm> (last accessed 19 October 2003) 
(China Daily December 30, 2002) 
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measures in the world.4 It is crucial for China not only to adopt a proper strategy to 
face anti-dumping charges but also to use antidumping measures to protect its own 
interests in international trade. 
In this paper, section II will provide an overview of antidumping measures under the 
WTO framework. It will paraphrase all the legal concepts relating to dumping and 
antidumping issues. Section III will illustrate the characteristics of the antidumping 
lawsuits against China. It will try to find the main reasons why so many countries 
prefer to choose China as antidumping target. Section IV provides some effective 
ways concerning how to successfully respond to the dumping charges against China. 
It will analyze some important cases in order to make this issue clearly. In addition, it 
will discuss how China's accession to the WTO helps the country shake off 
antidumping charges. Section Vis a conclusion. Based on the above study, it will give 
some strategic suggestions to the Chinese legislators and lawyers to improve the 
preparation work for fighting against antidumping charges and better protect its trade 
interests. 
II REVIEW OF CONCEPTS 
Article 6 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT), formulated in 1947 
and regarded as the most authoritative, defines dumping as when:
5 
-The export price of a product is lower than its normal value; 
-The product substantially harms the industry of the importing country; and 
-There are cause-and-effect linkages between dumping and the substantive harm. 
4 <http://www.china .org.c n/eng li sh/MATERlAU52433. htm> (last accessed 19 October 2003) 
(Chi na Daily December 30. 2002) 
5 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947. 
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The concept of dumping was made for dealing with underselling-related trade 
disputes on international trade in Article VI of GAIT in 1947.6 It allows its member 
states to impose antidumping duties to offset the margin of dumping of dumped goods 
as long as such dumping is causing or threatening to cause material injury to a 
domestic industry producing the same or like goods.7 
In response, States may take antidumping measures to counter dumping -- but only 
it:8 
a) They conduct an investigation. 
b) They determine that the dumped products cause or threaten to cause material injury to, or 
materially retard the establishment of, a domestic industry within the importing country. 
The WTO Antidumping Agreement regulates the application of anti-dumping 
measures by its member countries. The fundamental guideline is to prevent the use of 
dumping as non-tariff trade barriers.9 Nevertheless, if the antidumping measures are 
·not limited, or misused, this is in variance to the guideline of the WTO antidumping 
Agreement as well. Therefore, the prerequisite is to accurately understand the 
following key technical terms in order to avoiding wrongful utilization of 
antidumping. 
A Normal Value 
Normal value as the core judging standard regarding dumping is supposedly designed 
6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947. 
7 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art6. 
8 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art 6. 
9 Jason Z. Yin, Ling Li A11tid11111pi11g War and Northeast Asian Economies ( NEAE) :lssues and 
Strategic Options (PHD Research Paper Department of Management Hong Kong Polytechnic 
University, 2002) 
7 
to combat both price discrimination and predatory pricing. 10 Determination of normal 
value of goods is central to a determination of whether goods are being dumped. The 
reason is obvious that the comparison is made between export price and normal value. 
Whenever the export prices are less than their normal value, dumping occurs. The 
Anti dumping Agreement defines normal value as: 11 
• the comparable price for the product, in the ordinary course of trade, in the exporting country 
• if such a price is not available, normal value may be computed using a comparable price for 
the product exported to a third country 
• if this information is not available, the normal value for the product is "constructed" by 
expenses, and profit, etc. 
The alternative methods of ascertaining the normal value of imports in different cases 
can be divided into three categories including home country price, third country price 
and constructed norn1al value. 
B Dumping Margin 
The dumping margin is important because anti-dumping duties are limited to the 
dumping margin. The dumping margin is the differential between the export price of 
the imported product and its normal value. It can be formulated: 
12 
Dumping Margin = Normal Value - Export Sales Price 
The practice of calculating dumping margin involves three main steps. Firstly, it needs 
to establish a set of categories of the product under investigation. 13 Following that, 
10 Jason Z. Yin, Ling Li, above. 
11 Antidumping Agr~ement, chapter 8, art I 
12 Jason Z. Yin, Ling Li A11tidu111pi11g War and Northeast Asian Economies (NEAE):lssues and 
Strategic Options (PHO Research Paper Department of Management Hong Kong Polytechnic 
University, 2002) 
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within each category, a weighted average normal value is considered by reference to 
three methods, which are home country sales, third country sales or a constructed 
value. 14 Then, the normal value is compared with a weighted average export price for 
that category. If the normal value is higher, the difference is a positive dumping 
margin, which indicates there is dumping in the sense used in international trade 
policy. If the normal value is lower than the export price, a negative dumping margin 
would exist. In practice, when negative dumping happens, some countries such as 
European Communities, in calculating a total weighted average for all categories of 
the product under investigation, change the negative dumping margins to zero. This is 
called "zeroing." 15 
One issue that should be pointed out here is that "best-information-available" was 
often used to determine the dumping margin when the investing authority thought the 
defendants did not fully cooperate with them.
16 In this situation, the authorities can 
discretionarily choose alternative information, which is good for them. This is a really 
tricky problem in practice, because sometimes the defendants want to cooperate 
properly, but the time is too limited to prepare the requested information " including 
short response time to questionnaires and the required use of authority's mandated 
computer and accounting system". 
17 It is unfair that even if the respondents are 
unable to do so, the "best-information-available" will be applied. 
C Domestic Industry 
Domestic industry is defined as all the domestic producers as a whole of like products 
13 European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India 
< http://www.ejil.org/journal/curdevs/sr 15.nf > (last accessed 27 October 2003) 
14 European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India 
< http://www.ejil.org/journal/curdevs/sr I 5.rtf > (last accessed 27 October 2003) 
15 Anti-Dumping Agreement, art 2.4.2. 
16 Michael 0. Moore "Antidumping Reform in the United States A Faded Sunset" (1999) 33 Journal of 
World Trade, 1,3. 
17 0. Moore, above 1,3. 
9 
or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a maJor 
proportion of the total domestic production of those products, except that: 18 
i) When producers are related to the exporters or importers or are themselves importers of the 
allegedly dumped product, 
This means that domestic producers who are also importers, or related to importers, 
cannot be included in the term 'domestic industries' .19 
ii) ln exceptional circumstances the territory of a Member may, for the production in question, 
be divided into two or more competitive markets and the producers within each market may 
be regarded as a separate industry if (a) the producers within such market se ll all or almost 
all of the ir production of the product in question in that market, and (b) the demand in that 
market is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers of the product in question 
located elsewhere in the territory. ln such circumstances, injury may be found to exist even 
whe re a major portion of the total domestic industry is not injured, provided there is a 
concentration of dumped imports into such an isolated market and provided further that the 
dumped imports are causing injury to the producers of all or almost all of the production 
within such market. 20 
If the production in question is divided into two or more competitive markets, 
anti-dumping duties shall be levied only on the products m question consigned for 
final consumption to that area. 
The above interpretation provides guidance on how to determine which industries 
18 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 
part!, art4. 
19 Producers shall be deemed to be related to exporters or importers only if (a) one of them directly or 
indirectly controls the other; or (b) both of them are directly or indirectly controlled by a third person; 
or (c) together they directly or indirectly control a third person, provided that there are grounds for 
believing or suspecting that the effect of the relationship is such as to cause the producer concerned to 
behave differently from non-related producers. 
20 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 
part I, art4 
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belong to domestic industries of dumped products. The illustrative criteria of domestic 
industry is essential to judge whether or not dumping actions happen because it is the 
object of the material injury or the threat of injury. 
D Substantive Requirements 
In order to apply anti-dumping measures, it is necessary to show not only that 
dumping has occurred, but also that the dumping in question "causes ... or threatens 
material injury ... or materially retards establishment of a domestic industry."
2 1 Thus, 
the injury determination is a substantive requirement for initiating an antidumping 
claim. 
WTO rules regulate that injury cannot be implied by dumping, if it is so small that 
one would have to question whether such small sales, even if sold at dumped prices 
could cause injury. Therefore, a so-called de minimis rule applies.
22 
1 De minimis dumping volume 
Article 5.8 of the Anti Dumping Agreement illustrates that:
23 
the volume of dumped imports shall normally be regarded as negligible, if the volume of 
dumped imports from a particular country is found to account for Jess than 3% of imports of 
the like product, unless countries which individually account for less than 3% of the imports 
of the like product collectively account for more than 7% of the imports into the importing 
21 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art6. 
22 Anti-Dumping Agreement, art5.8. 
23 Anti-Dumping Agreement, art5.8. < http://commerce.nic.in/C4497e.doc >(last accessed 2 November 
2003) 
II 
Member. 
This illustration expresses clearly that if the volume of dumped exports is less than 
3% of total imports, then no material injury can be implied. 
2 De minimis dumping margin 
Article 5.8 provides that "[t]he margin of dumping shall be considered to be de 
minimis if this margin is less than two percent, expressed as a percentage of the 
export price."24 Therefore, the dumping margin is less than 2%, which is assumed as 
no dumping injury. 
However, in proving material injury, alleged dumping from several sources can be 
aggregated. 25 If the total dumping products are over the de minimus amounts , 
material injury may be determined to have occurred. 
E Procedural Requirements 
WTO Antidumping Agreement sets up both procedural requirements and substantive 
requirements in order to constrain the use of antidumping measures. " If, and only if, 
these two conditions are meet together, then the importing country may apply 
antidumping measures --- imposing antidumping duties."26 
24 Anti-Dumping Agreement, art5.8. 
25 < http://www.cid.harvard.edu/caer2/htm/content/papers/paper I I/paper l l .htm#ret9 >(last accessed 2 
November 2003) 
26 Ja on Z. Yin , Ling Li Antidumping War and Northeast Asian Economies (NEAE):lssues and 
Strategic Options (PHD Research Paper Department of Management Hong Kong Polytechnic 
University, 2002) 
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1 lnitiation & subsequent investigation 
An antidumping investigation is usually begun after the receipt of a written 
application filed by or on behalf of the domestic industry producing the like product. 
In exceptional cases the government of the importing country can begin an 
investigation without an application having been filed .
27 Article 5.2 in the 1994 Code 
also regulates that: 28 
an application shall include ev idence of (a) dumping, (b) injury within the meaning of 
Article Vl of GATI 1994 as interpreted by thi s Agreement and (c) a causal link between the 
dumped imports and the alleged injury. 
Therefore, a simple allegation, which is not substantiated, as well as related evidence, 
cannot initiate an antidumping investigation.29 
Article 5.3 of the 1994 Code requires the investigating authority to examine the 
accuracy and adequacy of the evidence in the application.
3° Clearly, the accuracy and 
adequacy of the evidence is relevant to the investigating authorities' determination 
whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation . "It is 
however the sufficiency of the evidence, and not its adequacy and accuracy per se, 
which represents the legal standard to be applied in the case of a determination 
whether to initiate an investigation ."31 
What is more, Article 5.4 of Agreement On Implementation Of Article VI Of GAIT 
27 The term "initiated" as used in the Antidumping Agreement means the procedural action by which a 
Member formally commences an investi gat ion. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, part I, art5. 
28 WTO Antidumping Agreement, art5.2 
29 WTO Anti dumping Agreement, art5.2 
30 WTO Anti dumping Agreement, art5.3 
31 Dongshe ng ZA G, S.J.D. Candidate "Seeki ng Transparency in Antidumping Actions through 
Procedural Rev iew: The GATI/WTO Juri prudence and Its Implications for China" (Conference on 
China and the World Trade Organization, Australia, 16-17March, 200 I) 
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codifies that the applicant must be able to represent at no less than 25 percent of the 
total domestic production of the like product.32 
Once the investigating authority decides to launch the antidumping investigation , it is 
required to give a public notice. 33 Neverthe less, the notice of initiation need not 
include a summary of the factors or analysis underlying, or a statement of the 
investigating authority's conclusion regarding, the exclusion of some producers from 
consideration as the relevant domestic industry by the investigating authority m 
satisfying itself that there is sufficient evidence of injury to justify initiation.34 
2 Provisional measures 
Provisional measures may be applied only if: 35 
-an investi ga ti on has been initi a ted in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 , a public 
notice has been given to that effect and interested parties have been given adequate 
opportunities to submit informatio n and make comments; 
-a pre liminary affirmati ve de termin ati on has been made of dumping and consequent injury 
to a domesti c industry; and 
-the authorities concerned judge suc h meas ures necessary to prevent injury be ing caused 
durin g the investigation. 
Article 7.2 authorizes provisional measures in two forms: either a temporary duty or a 
security by cash deposit or bond. The amount of above payments will be equal to the 
provisionally estimated dumping margin .36 
32 WTO Anti dumping Agreement art5.4. 
33 WTO Antidumping Agreement art 12. 1. 
The WTO Panel suggests that: given the function and contex t of Article 12. I in the Anti dumping 
Agreement, we interpre t thi s provi sion as imposing a procedural obligati on on the in vestigating agency 
to publi sh a notice and notify interes ted parties after it has taken a dec is ion that there is suffi cient 
evidence to proceed with an initiation. 
34 Dongsheng ZANG, above. 
35 WTO Antidumping Agreement, art? . I . 
36 WTO Antidumping Agreement, art7.2. 
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Under Article7.3, temporary anti-dumping measures cannot be adopted during the 
first 60 days of an investigation, and may remain in force for no longer than four 
months from the date they are announced. 37 Furthennore, the WTO Antidumping 
Agreement specifies that the extension of provisional relief for a total duration of six 
or nine months is allowed only when the authorities examine whether a duty lower 
than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to prevent injury. 38 Most importantly, 
the WTO Agreement requires that provisional duties should be judged necessary to 
prevent injury during the remainder of the investigation. 
3 Price undertakings 
A price undertaking mechanism refers to the investigating authorities come to an 
agreement with an exporter to either revise their prices or cease exports at dumped 
prices so as to eliminate the injurious effect of dumping. 39 
Three main elements of a price undertaking can be mentioned here. Firstly, a price 
undertaking is completely voluntary for both the individual exporters and the 
investigating authorities.40 Secondly, an undertaking can only be sought or accepted 
from exporters after a preliminary finding of dumping, injury and causal link.41 
Thirdly, a price undertaking can include monitoring and infonnation requirements, 
and the possibility of swift imposition of anti-dumping measures if the tenns of the 
undertaking are violated. 42 
In addition, any pnce increases by the exporter are limited to the amount of the 
37 WTO Antidumping Agreement, art7.3. 
38 WTO Antidumping Agreement, art7.4. 
39 WTO Antidumping Agreement, art8. I. 
40 <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto04/wto456.htm> (last accessed 13 
November 2003) 
~
1 WTO Antidumping Agreement, art 8.2. 
42 WTO Antidumping Agreement, art 8.6. 
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d · · 43 umpmg margin. It may be a beneficial measure for an exporter if the pnce 
d · 44 revision accepted in an undertaking is less than the margin of umpmg. 
Furthermore, a price increase according to an undertaking yields increased revenues 
for the exporter or importer, rather than increased duties for the government or the 
importing Member.
45 In general, the investigation will cease after a price undertaking 
is accepted. 
4 Final measures 
Article 9 of the Antidumping Agreement sets up the general principle concerning how 
to apply final measures for antidumping. "It states that imposition of anti-dumping 
duties is optional, even if all the requirements for imposition have been met."
46 It also 
illustrates a lesser duty rule that refers to authorities, which could impose duties at a 
level lower than the margin of dumping if this level is adequate to remove injury to 
the domestic industry.
47 What is more, the rules in the Antidumping Agreement tries 
to ensure that the amount of the anti-dumping duty eventually shall not exceed the 
margin of dumping and rules for applying duties to new shippers.
48 
F Sunset Review 
1994 Uruguay Round Agreements established a new provision that is called "Sunset 
Provision".
49 It required the authority to conduct a review no later than five years 
43 WTO Antidumping Agreement, art 8.1. 
44 <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto04/wto456.htm> (last accessed 13 
November 2003) 
45 <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto04/wto456.htm> (last accessed 13 
November 2003) 
46 <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto04/wto4_ l 9.htm> (last accessed 14 
November 2003) 
47 WTO Anti dumping Agreement, art 9.1. 
48 WTO Anti dumping Agreement, art 9.2 to art 9.5 
49 Michael 0. Moore " Antidumping Reform in the United States A Faded Sun et" (1999) 33 Journal of 
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after an antidumping duty order is issued.so The purpose is to determine whether 
revoking the order would likely lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and 
material injury.s1 In addition, it should be stressed that, the burden of proof lies with 
the investigating authorities, rather than exporters.52 It means the authorities should 
show why the order should not be revoked, but it is not the respondents responsibility 
to show the revocation of an order would not lead to renewed dumping and injury.53 
In order to show clearly how this provision is going in reality, this paper will analyse 
the US sunset review as an example. 
U.S. law stipulates that antidumping duty orders must be reviewed by Commerce and 
the International Trade Commission (ITC) every five years, and revoked unless it is 
demonstrated that dumping and material injury would be likely to continue or recur 
within a reasonably foreseeable time.54 There are two main stages involved in the 
sunset review process.55 
1 Possibility of dumping 
The main task for US Commerce is to determine the possibility of dumping if the 
dumping duty order is revoked. Three things could happen in this process. 
Firstly, after commerce informs domestic parties none of them participate into the 
World Trade, 1,6. 
50 Anti dumping Agreement, art 11.3. 
51 Antidumping Agreement, art! 1.3. 
52 Gary N.Horlick & Eleanor C. Shea "The World Trade Organization Antidumping Agreement" 
(1995), 29, Journal of World Trade, 5,29. 
53 Horlick & Shea, above,29. 
54 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (c) (1) (1994). 
55 Michael 0. Moore "Antidumping Reform in the United States A Faded Sunset" ( 1999) 33 Journal of 
World Trade, 1,7. 
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sunset review, the order will be revoked automatically.56 
Secondly, after Commerce direction, there is an inadequate level of response from 
interested domestic parties; an expedited review based on the facts available will be 
conducted.57 
Finally, full reviews are conducted if there is sufficient willingness to participate. One 
question arising here is that how to decide whether revocation of the anti-dumping 
order would be likely to lead to continuation or recunence of dumping. In general, it 
will decide dumping is likely to continue or recur if:58 
-dumping contin ued at any leve l above de minimis after the issuance of the order; 
-imports of the subject merchandi se ceased after the issuance of the order; or 
-dumping was eliminated after the iss uance of the order, and import volumes for the subject 
merchandi se declined significantly. 
The above regulation is rather problematic . For instance, according to this rule, in 
order to win the sunset review, the respondents have to show that after the dumping 
duty is imposed, at the same time the US sales will grow, although the price 
increases.59 This is an abnormal combination. But if the respondents fail to prove this 
illogical relationship then it means the likelihood of recurrence or continuation of 
dumping. 
2 Possibility of injury 
The main task for the ITC is to determine whether revocation of an order would be 
56 0. Moore, above 7. 
57 0. Moore, above 7. 
58 0. Moore, above 8. 
59 0. Moore, above 9. 
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likely to result in continuation or recurrence of material rnJury within a reasonably 
foreseeable time.60 
The ITC normally holds on although the standard in five-year reviews is not the same 
as that applied in the original anti-dumping investigations, it contains some of the 
same elements such as dumping margin.61 This is particularly unfair because the 
dumping margin will keep varying with the economic and market situation in 5 years. 
Therefore, it is obvious that under the sunset provision, antidumping orders can be 
automatically terminated only when no domestic industry responds. Otherwise, stem 
statutory requirements make it almost impossible to revoke an antidumping order. 
Thus, in fact, once an antidumping order is issued, it is more likely to stay on in effect 
for the foreseeable future. 
In conclusion , from the review of all above regulations it is clearly exposed that the 
nature of antidumping law is a general source of protection from foreign competition 
more than seeking the fairness of that competition. 
The antidumping laws are ambiguous and vague which leaves plenty of room for 
divergent interpretations. Moreover, various rules and procedures can be easily used 
to reach a conclusion of dumping. 
Although over the years of negotiation on Article VI of the GATT,62 the eventual 
outcome from 1994 Antidumping Agreement is that just as long as the domestic 
industry seeking protection could demonstrate it has been injured by the imports, then 
that is enough . They do not need to testify the imports are really dumped. Therefore, 
60 0. Moore, above 9. 
61 0. Moore, above 13. 
62 The first AD Code, negotiated in l 966-67 during the Kennedy Round, wa eventually replaced by 
the 1979 Code that emerged from the Tokyo Round. Further revision at the Uruguay Round yielded the 
l 994 AD Code. 
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m fact, nothing happened to protect fair competition at all. In addition, the current 
Agreement through strict procedural requirements evolved more and more difficulties 
for foreign enterprises to defend successfully against antidumping charges. 
III ANT/DUMPING CHARGES AGAINST CHINA 
China is the country most frequently targeted by other countries for anti-dumping 
investigation against its exports. According to statistics released by the WTO, 
Anti-dumping charges against Chinese manufacturers by overseas countries totalled 
500 by the end of 2002, accounting for 14 percent of the world's total , ranking first in 
the world. 63 Anti-dumping moves against China have been one of the most serious 
obstacles to the development of Chinese foreign trade, which costs China dozens of 
billions in lost export revenues. 64 
A Characteristics of Antidumping Charges 
Four mam characteristics are involved m foreign anti-dumping measures against 
Chinese merchandize: 
1 Variety of goods 
First of all, the variety of goods, which is brought under anti-dumping measures, has 
gradually enlarged. Since the first anti-dumping case against Chinese exports, foreign 
accusations have expanded from the original raw material products, such as mineral 
63 <http://engli sh. peopledai I y.com.cn/200309/ l 4/eng20030914_124248.shtml> (la t accessed 14 
November 2003) 
64 People's Daily <http://english.peopledaily.corn.cn/200309/14/eng20030914_ 124248.shtml> (last 
accessed 14 ovember 2003) 
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products and chemical products, to textile products, clothing, light industry products, 
home electric appliances, hardware, medicine and farm produce, etc.65 In particular, 
most of these litigations end with China losing and being facing high dumping 
duties. 66 
2 Increase of petitioners 
Secondly, petitioners who have filed anti-dumping lawsuits against China are no 
longer limited by "big eight", but include in more and more countries, such as 
Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria, South Africa, Nigeria, 
South Korea, New Zealand and Turkey.67 
3 High dumping duties 
Thirdly, the rates of dumping duties are dramatically growing. In the past, the rate of 
dumping duties imposed on Chinese goods normally were at 10-30 percent, but now it 
generally reaches 100-500 percent.68 In particular, Mexico even imposed a rate as 
high as 1,004 percent on China-made footwear. 69 Therefore, in fact, many Chinese 
export products have been squeezed out of these markets.
70 
65 Han Guojian China Learns How to Deal With Dumping Charges (submission to Chinese Fair Trade 
Bureau) 
66 Han Guojian , above. 
67 
Four developed countries, the U.S., EU, Australia and Canada initiated about 90% of antidumping 
investigations in the 1980s, which are referred as the "big four". Since 1995, four developing countries, 
India, South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil, became active in initiating antidumping activities. The four 
developed countries together with the four developing countries composed the "big eight". 
67 Han Guojian, above. 
68 Han Guojian, above. 
69 People 's Daily <hllp://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200309/ 14/eng200309 l 4_ 124248.shtml> (last 
accessed 14 November 2003) 
70 Han Guojian, above. 
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4 Original product rule 
In the end, more and more countries are adopting the rule of the origin of products as 
being the target of anti-dumping suits.71 This means that exports originally made in 
China and directly exported or indirectly exported through Hong Kong or other 
regions are also becoming the target of anti-dumping investigations as well.72 
B Key Reasons As Major Target 
The U.S. is the major trade partner for China, but it is also one of the nations most 
actively using antidumping measures against its trade partners, especially China. 
Following that, the other countries such as European Community (EU) also employed 
different strategies for antidumping determination against Chinese exports. So, the 
question arising here is that why these countries' keenness is to choose China as 
antidumping target. 
1 Non-market economy methodology 
It is found that most of the antidumping cases filed against Chinese goods were based 
on the 'non-market economy' status of China. If China is treated as a non-market 
economy in an import country 's trade law, this means that the import country does not 
determine whether or not a product is being dumped in their own market by 
comparing the price of a good imported from China with price of the same goods sold 
in China or in a third market. However, they can just simply use this assumption. The 
71 Grossman G.M. Strategic Trade Policies and the New International Economics ( l ed, MJT 
Cambridge, 1986) 47-68. 
72 Han Guojian, above.< C:\Documents and Settings\Harvey Norman\Desktop\antidumping !\"China 
Learns How to Deal With Dumping Charges.".htm> 
22 
presumption is that since China is in a transition from a planned to a market-based 
economy, not all of its domestic prices fully reflect supply and demand.73 For 
instance, Chinese government can subsidize some inputs greatly; thus, domestic 
prices of goods utilizing the inputs will not reflect the true cost of production.74 In 
this situation, comparisons of the home country prices with prices of the same goods 
sold abroad would not necessarily indicate whether or not a good is being sold at less 
than " normal value.75 As a result, constructed price is extensively used to decide the 
normal value in non-market economy country. 
The non-market economy methodology is against China in four different ways: 
(a) Labour cost 
Chinese producers claim that they are able to sell goods at prices lower than most of 
their competitors because of two main reasons. One is the lower labour cost; the other 
is that they do not have to comply with environmental standards. However, the 
non-market economy methodology believes that the labour costs are much higher than 
the actual labour cost of those prevailing in China. 76 These approaches reduce 
Chinese producers ' comparative advantage over its worldwide competitors.77 
(b) Calculation method 
Market economies also allow producers sometimes to sell their products for less than 
average total cost, which is named as marginal cost of production.78 However, the 
constructed value method normally includes profit when it calculates normal value. In 
73 Alford, William P. " When Is China Paraguay? An examination of the Application of the 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and Other 'Non-market 
Economy' Nations" ( 1987) 61 Southern California Law Review 79,81. 
74 Alford, William P, above, 85. 
75 Mah, Jai S.The United States ' Anticlumping Decisions against the Northeast Asian Dynamic 
Economies (Blackwell Publi shers Ltd, 2000) 721-732. 
76 Jason Z. Yin, Ling Li Anticlu111ping War and Northeast Asian Economies (NEAE):lssues and 
Strategic Options (PHD Research Paper Department of Management Hong Kong Polytechnic 
University, 2002) 
77 Jason Z. Yin, above. 
78 Ross , Lester and Ning, Susan " Modern Protectionism: China ·s Own Antidumping 
Regulations." (2000), The China Business Review, Washington 30-33 . 
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particular, the calculation of the profit margins depends on the selected sales, but does 
not use generally accepted accounting principles.79 As a result, it is not surprising that, 
they can establish that the Chinese goods are sold always at "dumping" price. 
(c) Definition of market economy 
The definition of market economy is not provided in WTO provisions . Therefore, no 
precise model of market economy conditions can be followed by the WTO members. 
In practice, each member has broad discretion in setting or even changing the 
conditions under which it applies non-market economy provisions in antidumping 
cases against Chinese industries.80 
(d) Outside of judicial review 
Finally, under some countries ' trade law such as US, the decision of the US 
Department of the Commerce (DOC) to designate a trading partner, as a non-market 
economy such as China, means that China is not subject to a judicial review. 81 So, 
undoubtedly, this puts Chinese government in a very difficult position to defend itse lf 
in antidumping cases through WTO dispute settlement system. 82 
It should be stressed that China's WTO Accession Agreement explicitly permits the 
U.S. to continue to use its anti-dumping methodology for fifteen years after China's 
accession to the WT0.83 It means China has accepted the discriminatory provision by 
allowing the United States and other WTO members to use the non-market economy 
methodology in dumping cases for another fifteen years from the time of its 
accession. 
As a result, as long as the antidumping cases against China are involved, it will 
79 Gary N.Horlick & Eleanor C. Shea "The World Trade Organi zati on Antidumping Agreement" 
( 1995), 29, Journal of World Trade,5,26. 
80 Ross, Lester and Ning, Susan ,above. 
81 Jason Z. Yin , Ling Li , above. 
82 Jason Z. Yin , Ling Li, above. 
83 U.S.-China WTO Accession Agreement 2000. 
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automatically follow a different procedure from another members. For instance, 
according to current antidumping laws in the U.S., when dealing with a non-market 
economy the price of the subject product in a comparable market economy must be 
used. 84 This is usually called the surrogate country approach.85 It will affect trading 
with China immensely as long as China is treated as a non-market economy country. 
However, in April 1998, the European Council with Council Regulation gave special 
treatment to Chinese companies. This special treatment gives Chinese producers the 
opportunity to claim that they operate business in market economy conditions on a 
case-by-case basis. 86 In order to take advantage of this special treatment, producers 
need to comply with the following requirements: 87 
- Company decisions must be made without significant State influence; 
- Accounts must be independently audited in line with international accounting standards; 
- Production costs and the financial situation of the company are not affected by distortions 
carried over from the former State-Jed economic system, barter trade or compensation of 
debts; 
It is obvious that this regulation does not grant China the status of full market 
economy. Nonetheless, for Chinese companies own options, if they can satisfy the 
above requirements; dumping calculations are based on their own domestic price. The 
constructed value method and the surrogate country approach will be not applied. 
Therefore, it is widely accepted by most of Chinese producers as a relatively fair 
treatment. 
84 U.S Antidumping Law 1995. 
85 Jason Z. Yin, Ling Li, above. 
86 Hong Kong Trade Development Council. "Commission proposal to maintain the current special 
anti-dumping regime for China." (2000) 14. 
87 Nadeem M. Firoz & Ramon E. GarciaA111idu111ping War against China and the Effects of WTO 
Membership (Montclair State University of USA) 
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2 Worrying about market share 
Another reason for some country's keenness to sue China is that they fear their market 
share will be affected after China enters the World Trade Organization and enjoys tax 
reduction treatment. 88 Therefore, it is reasonable to believe some countries' 
governments support or even encourage their domestic enterprises to attack China's 
export merchandise as dumped goods in order to perfectly protect their own trade 
interests.89 In the litigation , they can easily adopt non-market economy as excuse. It 
should be pointed out that as well as their insistence on regarding China as a 
non-market economy; they also refuse to give a separate ruling to Chinese 
state-owned enterprises. They definitely ignored the actual export price's differences 
between various enterprises that produce the same product.
90 Eventually, the same 
rate of dumping duties is levied, which generally affect exports of the whole industry 
in China. 
3 Lack of legal support 
The lack of antidumping or related legislation is also a major reason that its trade 
partners commonly attacked China as antidumping target. Without an advanced law, 
China has difficulty in reacting effectively to foreign anti-dumping charges on a 
d . b · 91 con-espon mg as1s. 
88 <C:\Documents and Settings\Harvey Norman\Desktop\antidumping !\"China Learns How to Deal 
With Dumping Charges.". htm> (last accessed 13 November 2003) 
89 Han Guojian China Learns How ro Deal With Dumping Charges (submission to Chinese Fair Trade 
Bureau) 
90 Han Guoj ian , above. 
91 Han Guojian, above. 
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"As a result, some countries have no scruples while attacking China for dumping. "
92 
IV HOW TO RESPOND TO ANT/DUMPING CHARGES AGAINST CHINA 
In recent years, the number of antidumping cases against China has considerably 
increased which bring numerous damages for Chinese international trading. 
In general, from the day, which an anti-dumping charge is filed , a Chinese producer is 
forced to halt the export of merchandise immediately. Two results might happen in the 
procedure, but neither of them is positive for the Chinese defendants. One is that the 
Chinese enterprise loses; it will either have to pay high dumping duties or promi e to 
raise the export price and reduce the export volume. Which means, it is quite possible 
for this enterprise to be driven out of the export market, even though the dumping 
duty rate was not too high, its exports would be decreased. On the other hand, 
probably, after investigation, the Chinese enterprises eventually win; but its export 
producers will be adversely affected as well because of the yearlong investigation and 
judgment. 
When one notices the serious result antidumping charges cause, then, it should be 
realized how important effectively responding to the unfair charges is . Therefore, it is 
urgent for Chinese exporters to pay great attention on how to properly deal with 
antidumping charges. 
However, in order to effectively respond to the antidumping lawsuits, the first 
important thing is to make sure that genuine dumping exists. 
92 Han Guojian, above. 
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A How To Test Genuine "Dumping"? 
As stated in the second part of this paper, dumping occurs when the imported goods 
are sold at a price below the normal value. Thus, first of all, normal value must be 
established. However, the question that arises here is: 
1 How to calculate normal value? 
In general, there are three common methods for the decision of normal value. 
(a) Three common methods 
(i) Home country price 
According to GATT stipulations, the normal value of a product equals the 
domestic price of the same or similar commodities in an exporting country.
93 
However, it is possible that, while there are some sales in the home country's 
market, the level of such sales is so low that its significance is questionable. 
Thus, the WTO Agreement recognizes that some sales in the home market 
may be so low in volume that they do not pennit a proper comparison of home 
k d · 94 mar et an export pnces. 
It provides that the level of home market sales is sufficient if home market sales 
constitute 5 per cent or more of the export sales in the country conducting the 
investigation, provided that a lower ratio "should" be accepted if the volume of 
domestic sales nevertheless is "of sufficient magnitude" to provide for a fair 
93 Agreement On Implementation Of Article YI of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 
ran!, art2. 
4 <C:\Documents and Settings\1-Iarvey Norman\Desktop\normal value.him> (last accessed 19 October 
2003) 
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comparison. 
(ii) Third country price 
When many items are produced specifically for export and no domestic 
equivalent is available. The alternative method for determining normal value is 
to look at the comparable price of the like product when exported to an 
appropriate third country. 
However, the WTO Agreement does not specify any standard for determining 
which kind of third country is appropriate. 
(iii) Constructed normal value 
When a price in the ordinary course of trade cannot be used as a normal value 
in the country of export, another option is constructed value. "A constructed 
value includes the cost of production and reasonable amounts for 
administration and selling costs, delivery charges, and other charges incurred 
in the sale, and an amount for profit."95 
This method uses many inputs, which are arbitrary. 96 Firstly, actual 
production cost information is confidential as it is normally proprietary. 
Secondly, an anti-dumping proceeding is adversarial. None of the exporting 
firm is likely to reveal such important information.97 Thirdly, the customs 
service is not able to record very precisely all the import transactions. 
Therefore, it is hard to accurately calculate normal value in this way. 
(b) The special rule for China 
95 <http://www.med.govt.nz/buslt/trade_rem/glossary/>(last accessed 27 October 2003) 
96 William Loehr Dumping and Ami-Dumping Policywith Applications in Lithuania (Discussion Paper, 
Harvard Institute for International Development, 1997) 
97 Loehr. above. 
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As mentioned above, in order to determine the existence of dumping, compansons 
normally would be made between the export price and home country price. However, 
China is treated as a non-market economy country so the rules of determination are 
different. The popular argument is that the export prices from a non-market economy 
country are monopolized by the State, which cannot reflect real value of the goods. 
Therefore, the normal value of Chinese export merchandise is calculated by the 
so-called analogue price.98 It means 
a surrogate country is often selected and the home country price is calculated based on prices 
in the surrogate market where like products are manufactured, preferably by the same process, 
and so ld , preferab ly under the same competitive conditions.99 
It is criticized that using surrogate country method to decide normal value often 
results in unfair and inaccurate comparison with the Chinese market. For instance, 
India and Pakistan often serve as su1Togates of China. 100 However. in reality, most of 
raw materials in both of them are cost much more than China. Moreover, deve loped 
countries such as Norway and France have also been surrogates of China; it is ignored 
that there is a significant gap in labour costs between the developed and deve loping 
counties, so that this seriously warps the real normal value. Therefore, this calculation 
method results in the "normal value" in name, which could be always higher than 
export price, so it is proved that "dumping" occurs. 
What is more, tremendous anti-dumping disputes relate to the decision of normal 
value, which in every case, the Chinese exporters initially argued that the type or 
volume of production, price charges, distribution of profits, or the company's right to 
98 < C:\Documents and Settings\Harvey Norman\Desktop\antidumping !\"China Learns How to Deal 
With Dumping Charges.htm>(last accessed 27 October 2003) 
99 Lei Yu " RULE OF LAW OR RULE OF PROTECTIONISM: ANTI-DUMP! G PRACTICES 
TOWARD CHINA AND THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEME T SYSTEM" (2002) Colu L Rev 293, 
311. 
100 Lei Yu, above, 368. 
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obtain, use, or dispose of capital are not controlled by the Chinese government. 101 
But, in reality, how to test all of above legal, financial and economic factors are 
independent from Chinese government is still a confusing issue because no uniform 
international standard can be followed 
(c) Shakeproof Assembly Components, Inc. v. United States 
In Shakeproof Assembly Components, Inc. v. United States, the petitioners m the 
investigation of helical spring lock washers challenged the US Commerce 
Department's (DOC) valuation of steel wire rod used by the Chinese manufacturer in 
d · 1 b. h d. 1 o~ pro ucmg t 1e su ~ect mere an 1se. -
Shakeproof Assembly Components, Inc. is a U.S. corporation, which imports washers, 
which are produced in China. 103 The washers are made up of steel wire rod, which 
are from about two-thirds Chinese steel and one-third steel purchased from the United 
Kingdom. (UK) 104 However, the US DOC determined the value of the washers by 
relying solely on the market price of the steel purchased from the U.K. 105 
Shakeproof challenged the determination, claiming that the DOC should not calculate 
the normal value of the steel only based on the UK's price and ignore the majority of 
steel are Chinese domestic steel. "The Court of International Trade (CIT) remanded 
the case to allow the DOC to show that its reliance on the market value of steel in the 
U.K. produced accurate results." 106 DOC stated that the steel's normal value should 
depend on the price from UK because it was actual evidence of market price for the 
steel in China. 107 Then, the CIT affirmed the decision and Shakeproofappealed to the 
101 Lei Yu, above, 369. 
102 Bernd G Janzen " INTERNATIONAL TRADE DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: 
THREE YEARS OFRIGOROUS REVIEW" (2003) 52 AMULR 1027, 1103. 
103 Shake proof Assembly Compo11enrs v. United States, I 02 F. Supp. 2d 486. 
10
• Shakeproof Assembly Components v. United States, above. 
105 Shakeproof Assembly Components v. United States, above. 
106 Shakeproof Assembly Components v. Uni red Stares, above. 
107 Shakeproof Assembly Componellls v. Unired Stares, above. 
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Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit continued to affirm the CIT 's decision. Judge 
Gajarsa wrote the opinion of the court, with Judges Clevenger and Schall on the 
panel.108 
The court held that Commerce may, but is not required to use prices in a surrogate country to 
determine the value of the washer. Furthermore, Commerce is required to use the best 
available information to determine the value of non-market goods. Commerce's actions in this 
case were therefore appropriate because it based its determination on actual evidence of the 
market value of the steel used in the production of the washers. The fact that the steel used to 
determine value made up only one-third of the total used in production was not dispositive. 
This paper thought this case has already used UK as surrogate country for decision the 
normal value of the steel but not of the whole washers. The reason is that China is 
non-market economy country, the normal value of domestic steel cannot be 
determined by its real price but by the UK'S steel price. Even more, it should be 
noticed that if the whole washer applies the surrogate country's price, but not just 
component part--steel, probably the normal value of the washer would reduce as well. 
As a result, through this case, it is obvious that the US court actually admitted the 
DOC's reliance on the best evidence available, including the market price of 
incorporated components, even if they merely compose of a small portion of the total 
amount used in the product. This is against fact, and not an accurate valuation of 
domestic components, and thus cannot provide a genuine antidumping valuation for 
the whole product. 
In conclusion, it is argued that the real dumping does not exist at all in this case. 
108 Shakeproof Assembly Components v. United Staces, above. 
2 How to assess injury ? 
The final purpose of anti-dumping legislation is not to prevent or punish dumping, but 
to protect domestic industries from being damaged by foreign unfair competition. As 
a result, an antidumping measure is merely allowed in cases where the dumping 
results in injury to the domestic industry. 
"However, in practice, how to test injury is a very controversial iss ue which involves 
various circumstances such as decline of market share, price undercutting, loss of 
profitability and so on." 109 All of above results have to be demonstrated that they 
actually come from the dumped goods, not from some other reasons, such as an 
. l 11 0 economic s ump. 
(a) The scope and degree of the injury 
The Antidumping Agreement clearly stipulates the scope of the injury from dumped 
goods. It states that: 111 
[a] II relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry shall 
be eva luated. The li st includes actual and potential dec line in sa les, profits, output, market 
share, productivity, return on investments, or utili za tion of capacity; factors affecting domestic 
pri ces ; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negati ve effects on cash 
fl ow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, abi lity to raise capital or investments. 
Furthermore, the Antidumping Agreement calls for the national authorities to testify 
109 Lei Yu " RULE OF LAW OR RULE OF PROTECTIONJSM: ANTI-DUMPING PRACTICES 
TOWARD CHINA AND THE WTO DISP UTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM" (2002) Colu L Rev 293, 
310. 
11 0 Lei Yu, above, 3 10. 
111 WTO Antidumpi ng Agreement, art3.4. 
33 
that dumped goods are resulting in injury within the meaning of the Agreement. 112 
However, it is not acceptable to just show that the domestic industry is simply 
suffering injury regardless of what extent the injury is. Therefore , it is necessary for 
the investigating authorities to test the level of each injury. According to the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement article 3.1: 11 3 
A determinati on of injury for purposes of Artic le VI of GATI 1994 shall be based on positi ve 
evidence and in vo lve an objecti ve examination o f both (a) the vo lume of the dumped imports 
and the e ffect o f the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) 
the consequent impact of these imports on domesti c producers of suc h products. 
The injury degree is evaluated in the foll owing aspects: 11 4 
Whether there has been a signifi cant increase in dumped imports, either in abso lute terms or 
re lati ve lo producti on or consumpti on in the importing Me mbe r. With regard to the e ffect of 
the dumped imports on pri ces, the in vesti gating authorities sha ll consider whether there has 
been a significant price underc utting by the dumped imports as compared with the pri ce of a 
like product o f the importing Member, or whether the e ffect of such imports is otherwise to 
depress pri ces to a significant degree or prevent pri ce increases, which otherwise would have 
occ urred, to a significant degree. 
The above illustrations show clearly that the WTO rules neither give an di spositive 
guidance on whether material injury occurs, 115 nor clearly provide an operational 
method on judging the injury degree, but just leaves the questi on of indicators 
open-ended, which could result in a country showing material injury and injury 
11 2 WTO Antidumping Agree ment, art3.5 . 
11 3 WTO Antidumpi ng Agree ment, art3. I. 
11 4 WTO Antidumping Agree ment, art3.2. 
11 5 It just s impl y points out a li st relating to potenti al indicators of injury. "See Part IV A 2 (a) The 
scope and degree of the injury" 
degree in any way that it likes for bringing an anti-dumping lawsuit. 116 
(b) Causal linkage between dumping and injury 
That dumping causes injury should be demonstrated in all the anti-dumping disputes. 
However, dumping combined with other factors together cause the injury that makes 
the issue more complicated. In this situation, 
[t]he authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports, which 
at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other 
factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. 117 
The most contentious issue that should be highlighted here is what are the necessary 
requirements for this causal link? Whether the dumped imports must merely be "a" 
cause of injury among other factors, or the "only" cause of the injury? 
(c) U.S.-Japan Steel case 
In the U.S.-Japan Steel case, Japan alleged that the US not only inadequately analyzed 
other factors affecting the industry, but also failed to ensure that injury caused by 
these other factors was not attributed to the dumped imports. 11 8 In response, the U.S. 
argued that the Antidumping Agreement does not demonstrate that the dumped 
. b h " 1 f .. " 119 imports must et e so e cause o tnJury . 
The Panel held that the ITC was not obligated under the Antidumping Agreement to 
demonstrate that dumped imports alone have caused material injury by deducting the injury 
116William Loehr Dumping and A11ti-DL1111ping Policywith Applications in Lithllania (Discussion Paper, 
Harvard In stitute for International Deve lopment, 1997) 
117 GATI art. VI l(b). 
Factors which may be relevant in thi s respect include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports not 
sold at dumpin g prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade 
restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in 
technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry. 
11 8 US-Japan Steel, supra note 48, paras. 7 .237 to 7.261. 
119 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 1994. 
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caused by other factors from the overall injury found to exist, in order to determine whether 
the remaining injury ri ses to the level of material injury. 120 
Japan appealed. Eventually, the Appellate Body reversed. The Appellate Body clearly 
pointed out that " it may not be easy, as a practical matter, to separate and distinguish 
the injurious effects of different causal factors." 121 And it further stated: 122 
[A)lthough thi s process may not be easy, thi s is prec isely what is envisaged by the 
non-altribution language. If the injurio us e ffects of the dumped imports and the other known 
factors remain lumped together and indi stingui shable, there is simply no means of knowing 
whether injury ascribed to dumped imports was, in rea lity, caused by other factors. 
The above interpretation apparently reveals: " the Antidumping Agreement requires 
investigating authorities to undertake the process of assessing appropriately, and 
separating and distinguishing, the injurious effects of dumped imports from those of 
other known causal factors." 123 
In conclusion, U.S.-Japan Steel case is a good precedent for Chinese respondents to 
cite and apply in their antidumping lawsuit. 
B Participating In The Case 
Pursuant to WTO Antidumping Agreement, if the exporters do not participate and 
provide the information required to conduct the investigation, the investigation 
authority has no option but to use the best information available to calculate the 
120 US-Japan Steel, supra note 48, para. 7 .260. 
121 US-Japan Steel, supra note 48 , para. 7 .260. 
122 US-Japan Stee l, supra note 48, para. 7 .260. 
123 US-Japan Stee l, supra note 48, paras. 7.237 to 7.261. 
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margin.
124 
It is universally known that the only information provided is that of the 
petitioners in most of antidumping cases, which may or may not reflect the real 
figures. This is absolutely disadvantageous for the defendants. As a result, 
participation should be firstly stressed when facing all the antidumping charges. 
One disastrous precedent of refusing to participate in antidumping charges can be 
illustrated here. 
1 Garlic war between three countries and China 125 
China's garlic export ranks number one in all over the world. Its annual output is 59 
billion metric ton, which composes of 66% of the total world production. However, 
the garlic export produced major antidumping disputes between China and its trade 
partners such as the U.S., South Korea and Japan. 
These three countries have files several antidumping litigations against China's garlic 
dumping. 
In 1992, the U.S. imported 3 million pound of garlic from China. The volume of 
garlic import surged to 64 million pound in 1994,making up of 50% of the U.S. garlic 
market. Eventually, it caused a U.S . antidumping investigation. 
Likewise, China's garlic export to South Korea grew up dramatically. The annual 
growth rates in 1997 and 1998 were 93.6% as well a 95.7% respectively. Korean 
garlic price dropped by 37.9% in 1999 due to the large volume of garlic import from 
China, which hurt the interest of the 30% domestic farmers. Therefore, they decided 
to start antidumping charges. 
124 WTO Anti dumping Agreement, art6. 
125 "Qiao Bao" ( 15-21 February 2002) East America p. A9. 
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At the same time, Japan, Thailand, Canada, Mexico and European Union also felt the 
threat of China's garlic dumping. Then, they initiate the antidumping accusation. 
2 The disaster for China 
Since 1994 the Chinese garlic industry actually has been shut out of the U.S. market. 
This is the result of a 376 percent dumping margin imposed for 5 years. It should be 
noticed that the affirmative injury determination of this case based completely on the 
inforn1ation provided by U.S. producers because Chinese exporters refused to 
participate. Afterwards, in the sunset review in 1999, no Chinese garlic firms attended 
the hearing again and the high import duty then automatically retained to date. 
In November 1999, Korean government suspended the import of garlic from China 
and followed up with 315% import duty in Chinese garlic in June 2000. 
Even worse, in 2002 the U.S. government suspects that the large volume of garlic 
imported from Thailand in the last two year might be originated from China. They 
began to apply the original product rule. 126 Which means they started its antidumping 
investigation on this . 
The garlic war is becoming worse and worse. 
3 What is learned from "garlic case" 
The most important lesson from this case is to participate and actively fight for the 
China's benefits in every proceeding step. 
126 Orig inal product rule "see Part Ill A 4 How to respond antidumping charges against China" 
In the "garlic case", if Chinese producers respond to the antidumping charges on time, 
and provide genuine information to calculate the margin , the dumping margin may not 
as high as 376 percent. In particular, after the high dumping duty has been imposed, 
Chinese exporters also should take part in the antidumping sunset review 
investigation that is trying to get the dumping margin down low enough, so that they 
b · · 127 can egm to export agam. 
Moreover, one should never hold the idea that losing only one export market is not 
important for China. The main reason is that failure to respond to the lawsuit will lead 
to a chain of anti-dumping cases against China in the future , accordingly paralysing 
the whole export trade. 
After the US easily issued the 376 percent antidumping duty on China's Garlic export, 
the antidumping petition against China became more and more popular in US. For 
example, US and China "Honey" trading covered 20 million U.S. dollars of Chinese 
imports. 128 Just after the "garlic case", the US sued China for honey dumping, 
following that; the U.S. bicycle producers initiate the antidumping case on Chinese 
bicycles, which covered 180 million U.S. dollars of Chinese imports.129 After these 
cases, the Mushrooms and Indigo antidumping cases against China were coming in 
tum. 130 After the little Garlic case, US antidumping charges against China covered 
almost 300 million U.S . dollars of Chinese imports .131 "All in all , from little seeds, 
b. 0 ,,132 10 trees grow. 
Therefore, Chinese exporters should recognize as long as they actively respond to 
dumping charges their probability of winning will increase. Otherwise, the only 
127 Perry, William E. " U.S. Antidumping Cases Against China-Lessons Learned." July 10, 2001. 
128 "Qiao Bao" (15-21 February 2002) East America p. A9. 
129 "Qiao Bao" ( 15-2 l February 2002) East America p. A9. 
130 "Qiao Bao" ( 15-2 l February 2002) East America p. A9. 
13 1 <C:\Documen ts and Sellings\Harvey Norman\Desktop\antidumping !\U.S. Antidumping Cases 
Against China - Lessons Learned.htm> (last accessed 12 November 2003) 
132 Perry, William E. "U.S. Antidumping Cases Against China-Lesson Learned." July 10, 2001. 
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answer is definite failure. 
B A Good Start Predicts An Half of Successfulness133 
In order to obtain an antidumping order, petitioners must satisfy substantive 
requirements and procedural requirements, which refer to high dumping margins and 
injury or threat of material injury. 134 As long as petitioners are able to get this far, the 
antidumping order will be issued after the initial investigation, which means the only 
recourse left to Chinese defendants is to fight for a lower dumping margm m 
antidumping review investigations so that they can export again. 135 
Therefore, the most vital suggestion for Chinese defendants is trying their best to beat 
the petitioners in the first investigation. In order to win the charges, three methods 
could be pointed out here. If no injury can be found, if low antidumping margins can 
be calculated, or negotiating suspension agreements between the Chinese producers 
and petitioners can be reached which means China win the antidumping case.136 
Winning the cases indicates that the import countries market is still open to Chinese 
exporters. On the contrary, if the petitioners win, an antidumping order will be issued 
and stay in place with high dumping margins for a long while. 137 For instance, in 
1983, US Commerce Department (DOC) issued an antidumping order on barium 
chloride from China; afterwards, seldom barium chloride has been exported to US for 
nearly twenty years. 138 In 1999, in the Sunset Review investigation the US 
International Trade Commission (ITC) determined to leave the antidumping order on 
barium chloride from China in place for another five years, beginning from 2000 to 
133 This is an old Chinese saying, which mea ns the first win is vital for the final success. 
134 "See Part 11 D & E Substantive Requirements & Procedural Requirements" 
135 Nadeem M. Firoz & Ramon E. GarcfaA11tid11mping War against China and the Effects of WTO 
Membership (Montclair State University of USA) 
136 Nadeem M. Firoz & Ramon E. Garcia, above. 
137 Perry, William E. "U.S. Antidumping Cases Against China-Lessons Learned." July 10, 2001. 
138 William E., above. 
2005 139 . Although the antidumping prov1s1ons in the 1995 Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act provide for DOC and ITC sunset review investigations every five 
years in case after case, in Barium Chloride case, the DOC and ITC continue to leave 
antidumping orders in place so long, because the U.S. domestic industry fights to keep 
them in place. 140 
Now, this paper will focus on analyzing some key antidumping disputes between US 
and China. Through illustration of various cases, Chinese exporters will learn 
different experiences and lessons concerning how to increase the opportunities of 
winning the antidumping case in the initial investigation. 
1 
(a) 
US-China Sebacic Acid dispute 
Back around 141 0 
On July 19, 1993, Union Camp Corporation filed a petition with DOC and the ITC, 
alleging that sebacic acid was being sold at prices below fair market value to the 
damage of the US domestic industry. 142 After investigation, it was determined that 
Union Camp's allegations had merit and Commerce published an antidumping duty 
order on sebacic acid from the People 's Republic of China (PRC). 143 
(b) Analysis 
139 The World Trade Organization sunset measure requires the administrative authorities responsible 
for implementing anti-dumping laws -- in the United States, the Commerce Department and the U.S. 
International Trade Commission -- to review all oulstancling anti-clumping orders after five years. The 
WTO instructs authorities to determine whether clumping and injury from dumping would like ly recur 
if the anti-dumping order were 1erminated. 
140 Greg Mastel "The Sunset Review is Being Turned on Its Head" (2000) 
<http://www. newamerica. nei/i ndex. c f m ?pg=arti c le&pu b I 0=222> 
141 J.S.STONE,INCvTHEUNITEDSTATES(2003) l47US l ,l. 
142 Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation ; Sebacic Acid from the People 's Republic of China, 
58 Fed. Reg. 43,339 (Aug. 16, l 993). 
143 
Antidumping Duty Order: Sebacic Acid from the People's Republic of China (PRC), 59 Fed. Reg. 
35,909 (July 14, 1994). 
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In the above case, the Chinese exporters were able to win the ITC injury case, merely 
because the importers appeared and testified in person at the ITC hearing. 144 
Firstly, U.S. importers persuaded five U.S. manufacturers that used sebacic acid m 
their production process to give evidence on behalf of the Chinese. 145 
Furthermore, the US importers tried to find low surrogate values to apply in order to 
cut down the dumping margins. Eventually, the Chinese exporters have been able to 
drive the dumping margins down to 0%. 146 In this case, the U.S. importers argued 
strongly against the high surrogate values that the petitioner tried to persuade the 
authority to use. The hot debate was over the co-product and octanol. 147 The 
petitioner looked forward the DOC to choosing the petitioner's internal price for 
co-product. The reason is that once the internal price was used; the dumping margins 
for the Chinese exporters would triple. 148 
Union Camp, the petitioner, argued that the Indian surrogate value for octanol, was not for 
the octanol produced by the sebacic acid factories. 149 The importer and the di stributor, 
however, were able to prove to the DOC that the Indian "octanol " quote was for a product 
that was comparable to the product produced in the sebacic acid production process .150 
The importer's argument, therefore, saved the Chinese exporters and kept the dumping 
margins low. 
Finally, if the Chinese exporters lose at the ITC, the importers can also agree to 
import for test sales so as to lower the dumping margins in the antidumping review 
investigations. This has significantly positive effect of opening up the U.S. market to 
the Chinese exporters. 
144 William E., above. 
145 Nadeem M. Firoz & Ramon E. GarcfaAntid11111ping War against China and the Effects of WTO 
Membership (Montclair State University of USA) 
146 William E., above. 
147 William E., above. 
148 William E., above. 
149 J.S. STONE, !NC v THE UNITED STATES, above. 
150 J.S. STONE. !NC v THE UNITED STATES, above. 
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In the Sebacic Acid case, after the antidumping order was issued, an US importer in 
the allies also agreed to import a small amount of sebacic acid for Sinochem Tianjin 
so that it could do the first review investigation. 151 Sinochem Tianjin now has the 
lowest dumping margin and is one of two Chinese exporters that continue to export 
sebacic acid to the United States. 152 
(c) Lesson: working with the importers 
This case clarifies that effort from either exporter or importers alone may not win the 
case. They should try to form allies to participate together in the antidumping case. 
The reason is that Chinese exporters are interested in bringing their products to the 
export countries; the importers are interested in buying those products. It makes sense 
that they both work together to fight dumping charges. In particular, when Chinese 
companies are not familiar with the situation in the foreign market, the necessary help 
from insiders is needed. Finally, Chinese exporters should understand that the 
importers are the parties that are liable for any increase in antidumping margins in the 
antidumping review investigations. 
In conclusion: Chinese defendants should try to make close allies with importers and 
fight together against unfair charges. 
2 US-China Silicon Carbide dispute 
(a) Background 
In 1991, the US DOC first permitted different Chinese export companies in the same 
151 J.S. STONE, !NC v THE UNITED STATES, above. 
152 Sinochem Tianjin refers to a Chinese sebacic acid exporter. 
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antidumping case can apply separate dumping margins. 153 In 1993, however, the 
DOC reversed course in Compact Ductile Iron Waterworks Fittings from China 
(CDIW). 154 As the Department stated in the Silicon Carbide case: 155 
In CDTW, we Loo k the position that state-ownership (ownership by all the people) provides 
the central government the opportunity to manipul ate the exporter 's price whether or not it 
has taken advantage of that opportunity during the peri od o f in ves ti gation. Thus, we 
conc luded in C DIW that slate-owned ente rpri ses would not be e li gible for se parate rates. 
In the Silicon Carbide case, however, the DOC reversed the direction and resume the 
Chinese exporters separate dumping margins because of the following reasons : 156 
However, based upon further analys is a nd in fo rmati on deve loped in the course of the 
in vestigati on, we find that ow nership: by all the people, in and o f itself, cannot be 
considered as disposi ti ve in determining whether those companies can receive separate rates. 
At verificati on . .. MOFfEC .. . ex plained that the designati on on these responde nts 
business li censes that they are "owned by a ll the people" does not mean that the centra l, 
provincial , or loca l governments co ntrol these compani es. In stead, "ownership by the 
people" s ignifies that "no indi vidual can ta ke the company; it cann ot become a private 
company. " The compan y "be longs to the co mmunit y" and the co mpany' s e mpl oyees are 
entrusted with the manage ment of the company. 
(b) Analysi s 
The separate rates issue allows different Chinese exporters involved in the same 
antidumping charge to have separate dumping margins. Silicon Carbide case re flec ts 
this issue clearly. In thi s case, the Department established certain legal and factual 
153 Sparklers From the People's Republic o f C hina: Pre liminary Results of Antidumping Duty 
Admini strative Review < http ://ia.ita.doc.gov/fm/0004frn/00-406t.txt > (last accessed 13 ove mber 
03) 
154 SHAKEPROOF ASSEMBLY COMPONENTS DIVISION OF ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS, INC. v 
THE UNITED STATES (2000) 97 US. 
155 Silicon Carbide from Chin a, 59 Fed. Reg. 225 86 (May 2, 1994) . 
156 Silicon Carbide from China, above. 
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criteria, which are used to judge whether the Chinese accused were entitled to 
applying their own dumping margins. 157 However, they must satisfy the certain 
criteria. 
Four key questions are usually asked to assess whether or not the Chinese exporters' 
an-ive at the criteria. 158 Firstly, whether the prices of the exporters are made or 
influenced by Chinese government approval? Secondly, Whether the Chinese 
exporters have the right to negotiate and sign contracts with their trade partners? 
Thirdly, whether the exporters have power to make their own decisions concerning 
the selection of management? "Finally, whether the companies are entitled to retain 
the proceeds from their own export sales and make independent decisions regarding 
the disposition of profits or financing of losses?" 159 
Since the Silicon Carbide case, the US DOC has routinely permitted almost every 
Chinese exporter to apply its own dumping margins. 160 However, one requirement is 
necessary that they must provide sufficient evidence to prove that they are not owned 
or dominated by the Chinese government. This is a big improvement for US and 
China trading relationship. 
(c) Lesson: restructure of enterprises 
Through the above analysis, it is apparent that as long as the Chinese enterprises can 
testify that the Chinese government is not their real boss, they will apply the separate 
rate in the antidumping cases. In reality, the most effective way to prove a company 
not controlled by the government, but by themselves, is that they are stock companies. 
Because once they own the more stock of a company, which definitely means they 
take control of that company. As a result, the suggestion can be provided here is that 
Chinese enterprises should issue stock and buy up that stock. 161 Once the stock is 
157 The certain criteria "see Part IV B 2 (b) How Lo respond to anti dumping charges against China" 
158 Perry, William E. " U. S. Antidumping Cases Against China-Le sons Learned." July 10, 2001. 
159 William E., above. 
160 Firoz &Garcfa, above. 
161 Firoz &Garcfa, above. 
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issued and the company buys a controlling interest of the company they will be the 
acknowledged bosses. 
In conclusion: the stock company will be an ID card of applying separate rate in the 
antidumping cases. 
3 US-China Crawfish dispute 
(a) Background 162 
In September of 1996, the US domestic crawfish producers filed an antidumping 
petition with the DOC, alleging that freshwater crawfish tail meat from China was 
sold in the United States at less than fair market value in its home country. With 
respect to the petition, the DOC initiated an investigation. It sent questionnaires to 
various Chinese freshwater crawfish tail meat exporters as well as producers . 
The DOC still adopted a presumption that the People's Republic of China was a non-market 
economy country in thi s proceeding, requiring companies desiring an individualized 
anti dumping duty margi n to so request and to demonstrate an absence of state control. 163 
On August 29, 1997, the US ITC made a decision that the Chinese exporters were in 
fact dumping crawfish in the U.S. and then, imposed the dumping duty ranging from 
91 % to 200%. 
(b) Analysis 
In the first investigation, Chinese exporters and producers did not appear at the ITC 
162 Huaiyin Foreign Trade Corp. ( 30) v. United Stares DOC. (2002) US 20 I F. Supp. 2d 1351 
163 US-China Crawfish Dispute <http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TD/craychin.htrn> (last 
accessed 20 November 03) 
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hearing so they lost a good chance to actively defend that the freshwater crawfish tail 
meat exports would not injure or threaten injury to the U.S. producers. It should be 
pointed out that just because the Chinese exporters and producers did not show up at 
the ITC hearing and make their views known , eventually, the dumping margin was 
imposed 201.63 percent ad valorem for all crawfish tail meat imported from China as 
a whole and by exporters that failed to demonstrate independence from governmental 
control. 164 However, when the China-wide rate applied by default, one exporter 
(Huaiyin-5) 165 trading in crawfish tail meat stood up and effectively testified an 
absence of state control. It met the requirements for an individualized duty margin . As 
a result, it merely received a company-specific 91.5 percent ad valorem duty margin . 
(c) Lesson: Paying attention to hearing 
In this case, one of common mistakes those Chinese exporters often make is revealed 
clearly, they are often absent in the ITC hearing. 
Once the dumping case is filed , the DOC hearing and the ITC hearing will happen in 
tum. The DOC hearing is not as important as the ITC hearing because usually by the 
time of the DOC hearing, the investigative authority has already made its decision 
with respect to whether dumping exists. 166 Therefore, even appearance at the hearing 
will usually not affect the result of the case. "In direct contrast, however, testimony by 
the Chinese exporters and producers at the ITC hearing can make the significant 
difference between winning and losing the injury case." 167 
At the ITC hearing, the Commissioners appear in person to listen to the parties' 
arguments .168 In particular, they are interested in the defence on threat of material 
164 Huaiyin Foreign Trade Corp. ( 30) v. United States DOC.above. 
165 Huaiyin-5 refers to one of Chinese freshwater crawfish tail meat producers which is involved m the 
US and China antidumping dispute in 1996. 
166 William E., above. 
167 William E., above. 
168 About the ITC Hearing< http://www.moldanddiefairtrade.org/AboutITC.htm >( last accessed 20 
November 03) 
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rnJury to their domestic industry rn the near future. 169 There are two absolutely 
distinguished reactions between the defendant's appearance and absence. The 
presence and testimony of the Chinese producers and exporters can reassure the ITC 
Commissioners that their export activities will not threaten the U.S. industry in the 
future. 170 "If the Chinese exporters and producers even are afraid of appearing at the 
hearing, to an ITC Commissioner, this action in and of itself can indicate a threat of 
. I . . ,, 111 matena mJury. 
In conclusion, Chinese defendants should take part in the hearing, particularly, paying 
great attention to the ITC hearing. 
C Balancing Gain and Loss 
The above statement sufficiently expresses the disaster from failure in an antidumping 
lawsuit. On the contrary, as an old saying goes there is a price for every victory. This 
means, in the antidumping cases, even win also need pay the price. 
For instance, if Chinese defendants win the lawsuit because they prove no injury or 
threat of injury existing at all; then the problem will come from the "free rider "in 
China. 172 If the Chinese exporters win the case because they are only imposed 
extremely low dumping duty, they will face annual antidumping review investigations 
in the future. 173 Finally, if the Chinese exporters successfully obtain a suspension 
agreement, they must cut down export volumes under quota and increase the price of 
the merchandize over the price floor, undoubtedly, which will lose the competitive 
169 About the ITC Hearing< http://www.moldanddiefairtrade.org/AboutlTC.htm >(last accessed 20 
November 03) 
170 About the ITC Hearing< http://www.moldanddiefairtrade.org/ AboutlTC.htm >(last accessed 20 
November 03) 
171 Perry, William E. "U.S. Antidumping Cases Against China-Lessons Learned." July 10, 2001 
172 Free rider "See Part IV C I Free rider" 
173 William E., above. 
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174 William E., above. 
2 Low antidumping duty 
As mentioned above, some scholars hold the opm1on that they would rather have 
imposed the low dumping duty instead of free rider problem. Therefore, two things 
may happen. Either the Chinese exporter can get a dumping margin less than 2%, 
which is the best situation because the exporter is excluded from the dumping 
d 175 I h h . b. I . . . . 176 0 "f or er. t means t at t e case 1s not su ~ect to annua review mvest1gat1ons. r 1 
the dumping margin is over 2%, the authority will reach an affirmative determination, 
which predicts that the problems have started. 177 Once the antidumping order is 
issued, a year later, the antidumping review investigation will initiate. 178 In order to 
keeping the low dumping duty, the Chinese exporters must continue to take part in the 
annual review investigations. 
As a result, although without the free rider problem, even worse, the price of a victory 
through low dumping duty is yearly review investigations. 179 This means Chinese 
exporters need to keep on paying the legal fees year-by-year and continue to ri.sk of 
losing the export market. 
In conclusion, it is wise for all the Chinese enterprise to give up this costly method as 
soon as possible. 
3 Suspension Agreement 
A suspension agreement is a negotiated agreement between the interested parties, 
175 "See Part II D 2 De minimis dumping margin" 
176 "See Part II D 2 De 111i11imis dumping margin" 
177 Compendium of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws in the Western Hemisphere 
< hup://www.ftaa-alca.org/Wgroups/WGADCVD/english/050 I 00.asp> (last accessed 20 ovember 
03) 
178 Compendium of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws in the Western Hemisphere, above. 
179 William E., above. 
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which indicates the halt of the antidumping lawsuit with issuing a quota and a price 
floor. 180 
Suspension agreements firm a price floor. Sometimes, the price floor is so high that it 
will lead to substantial influence of decreasing the export volume. Moreover, the floor 
price can be revised yearly based on historical data.181 In a whole year, the market 
conditions are varying all the time, however, once the reference price is fixed, it will 
be kept on one year. One simple example can be mentioned here to illustrate this rule 
is unpractical. The prices of seasonal fruit automatically change in different seasons. 
It is supposed that the price in summer is the lowest. So, if in reference to the winter's 
price, the fruit 's price floor is made, this means the exporters will be definitely driven 
out of the summer market due to unbelievably high price. In fact, this rule artificially 
sets up an obstacle for the exporters. 
D Establishing Quicker-response System 
In order to efficiently respond to the dumping charges before they become lawsuits, 
the Chinese government should set up a quicker-response mechanism as soon as 
possible . Simultaneously, the old antidumping early warning system, which was set 
up by the Chinese government for dumping charges in major markets such as the 
United States, the European Union, Australia, and South Korea, should be improved 
f · k 182 Ch. h . . d in support o qu1c er-response system. mese aut ont1es nee try their best to 
prevent from the increasing of dumping charges in the future. 
180 < http://www.ex im.gov/products/policies/proposa l.html > (last accessed 20 September 2003) 
18 1 William E., above. 
182 " More effort needed to fight anti-dumping charges" ( 16 September 2003) China Daily Hong Kong 
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I Function 183 
First of all, this system should be able to accurately and closely monitor all the 
Chinese exporters' price and quantity. 
Secondly, it can provide timely and proper suggestions on adjusting the pnces or 
export destinations to avoid the possible antidumping disputes. 
Finally, the systems can also keep a tab on anti-dumping moves in import countries 
and help Chinese enterprises react rapidly. 
2 Composition 
The quicker-response system will be composed of government departments , import 
and export chambers of commerce, local foreign trade authorities and professional 
law firms. It is supposed to invite some foreign importers to join in the system. 
E Acknowledgement Of Market Economy 
"Although a market economy status is not the trump card that will overcome anti-dumping 
charges, but it will still be important in making the anti-dumping actions against Chinese 
products fairer." 184 
1 Past 
In every anti-dumping case, Chinese company had to demonstrate that their business 
183 
" More effort needed to fight anti-dumping charges" ( 16 September 2003) China Daily Hong Kong 
184 Li Xiaoxi, a famous economics profes or at Beijing Normal University in China. 
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operations are fully market-oriented in order to getting rid of extra antidumping tariffs. 
To do so, they had to have their cost structures recognized in anti-dumping 
investigations, incurring legal fees of up to US$200,000 in the process .185 These 
expenses are the huge burden for most of Chinese enterprises. Therefore, the Chinese 
government took advantage of every opportunity for China to seek recognition as a 
market economy. 
2 Now 
According to a World Bank report, the pnce of more than 90 percent of Chinese 
products are determined by the market rather than by the government. 186 Thus, the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and some other important international 
organizations all recognize China is a market economy. This is a good beginning. 
3 Future 
It is necessary to urge Chinese government to step up more pressure on foreign 
governments through negotiations to grant Chinese enterprises full market economy 
status as soon as possible. 
F Advantages From WTO Membership 
WTO membership will bring three main aspects of positive impact to China m 
dealing with dumping charges issue. 
1 5 "Commentary: Anti-dumping cases use f1awed data" ( 11 August 2003) China Daily Hong Kong 
186 "Commentary: Anti-dumping cases u e flawed data" ( 11 August 2003) China Daily Hong Kong 
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1 Promote market economic structure 
First of all, WTO membership will speed up China's economic reforms and 
opening-up. At the same time, it will further expedite the establishment and 
. f k . 187 Th f . . d improvement o a socialist mar et economic structure. ere ore, 1t 1s expecte 
that Chinese exporters can get more market economy treatments in future 
antidumping proceedings. 
2 Improve judicial standard 
Following that, China as one of WTO members can not only take part in the 
development of WTO rules and procedures, but also can protect its national interests 
through active participation in the new round of talks. 188 Thus, this will give China a 
good opportunity to gain some advanced experiences for improving its own 
legislation standard, more importantly, learning how to better implement the law . 
. d · 189 Since 25 March 1997 China has already established its anti umping system. 
China's State Council issued administrative regulation, which is named Dumping 
Prevention and Offset Tari ff Regulations as the fundamental antidumping rule. 190 
Afterwards, in December 2001, the Chinese Antidumping Law was enacted by 
People's congress Council. 
191 
The antidumping remedy set out in this Law is 
strengthened consistently with WTO entitlement and obligations. This is a big 
development in China's international trade law area. 
However, so far, neither of them has been sufficiently implemented yet. In particular, 
187 Xiang Liu &Hylke Yandenbussche EU A11tidwnpi11g Cases Against China: An Overview and Fwure 
Prospects With Respect To China 's WTO Membership (Catholic University of Leuven, 2002) 
188 Leonard K. Cheng China's Accession to the World Trade Organization and Its Effects 011 the 
Chinese and Hong Kong Economies (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 200 l) 
189 John Magnus & Dewey Ballantine China's Antidwnping Laws and Regulations: What do they say? 
How do they affect U.S. exports ? Are they consistent with WTO Agreement ? (ABA Panel, 2002) 
190 Magnus & Ballantine , above. 
191 Magnus & Ballantine, above. 
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one element involved in China's anti-dumping regulation is that ' when foreign 
countries take discriminatory anti-dumping action against Chinese products, China 
can take retaliation action' .192 This article was not used properly and effectively to 
fight against numerous dumping charges against China in the past. It can be expected 
that in future China will actively learn how to use its antidumping regulations for 
protecting its trade interest. 
In the end, the WTO non-discrimination principle will insure China can respond to the 
dumping charges under a multilateral equal and mutually beneficial trade 
environment. 193 
3 Use WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
Thirdly, China will more successfully fight discriminatory dumping charges because 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism would be used to resolve the upcoming 
antidumping disputes .194 China is entitled to equally resolve and handle economic 
and trade disputes among WTO members .195 
Nevertheless, regardless of which kind of impact that China would have on WTO, it 
still cannot shake off one question: "WTO membership would not he lp in its most 
difficult iss ue with antidumping actions -- the non-market economy standard. " 196 
WTO membership still leaves China in the same place to defend against dumping 
192<http://www.google.co. nz/search?q=cache: ke IQ KHXd m K8J :www.econ. ku leuven .ac. be/tew/academi 
c/account/me mbers/H ylke/INTER ATlO AL%2520PUB L1CATIO S/EU-C HI NA %2520JULY %252 
02002VERSIE2 %2558 I %255D.DOC+%22when+foreign+countries+take+discriminatory+anti -dumpi 
ng+acti on+aga inst +Chi nese+products,+Ch ina+can+take+retaliation+acti on % 22&hl=en&start= I &ie= U 
TF-8>(last accessed 13 November 03) 
193 Leonard K. Cheng China's Accession to the World Trade Organi::.ation and Its Effects 0 11 the 
Chinese and Hong Kong Economies (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2001) 
194 Dongsheng ZANG, S.J.D. Candidate "Seeki ng Transparency in Antidumping Actions through 
Proced ural Review: The GATT/WTO Jurisprudence and Its Implications for C hina" (Confe rence on 
China and the World Trade Organi za tion, Australia, l 6- l 7March, 200 I) 
195 Leonard K. Cheng China's Accession to the World Trade Organi::.ation and Its Effects 011 the 
Chinese and Hong Kong Economies (Hong Kong Univer ity of Scie nce and Technology, 200 I) 
196 ZANG, above. 
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charges. As a result, China may more uccessfully confront foreign companie 
su pected of dumping in Chinese market in the future. 197 
V CONCLUSION 
The key issue involved in antidumping measure is whether the protection of local 
industry is more important than the benefits of increased world\\ ide fair competition 
and economic integration. If the answer is no, it should be realized that the importance 
of a fair trade environment would contribute to promoting the economic development 
of both trading parties but not to subsidize either of them. In other words. attempting 
to establish the global fair trading relationship should be regarded as the final goal of 
all the countries. Antidumping is just a tool to achieve this effort. 
Therefore, it does not matter who either the import or export country is, both need 
perfectly comply with the following rules: 
A Initiator: To Use But Not To Abuse Antidumping Measures 
It is obvious that WTO antidumping agreement has not been implemented as it was 
intended to: temporarily offset unfair competition arising from price discrimination 
'd d h I d. . 198 and to prov1 e reme y to t e re ate 111J ury. 
In practice, it has been used as safeguard to protect domestic producers from open 
competition. Sometimes, it is really confusing as to whether anti-dumping has been 
transfened into anti-competition. For example, most of US antidumping charges 
197 Xiang Liu &Hylke Vandenbussche EU A11tidw11pi11g Cases Against China: An 01•erview and Fut11re 
Prospects With Respect To China's WTO Membership (Catholic University of Leuven, 2002) 
198 "See Part I Introduction" 
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against China were initiated just when Chinese e ports to the U.S. increased 
b . . 199 I su stantially and the related U.S. producers met the trong compet1t1on. n 
response, the .S. government resorts to antidumping mea ure against China more 
than any other countries because antidumping does seem to be the most effective 
method to help US to block and stop imports. However, this is actually discriminating 
against developing economies. This antidumping action should be justified. 
B Respondent: To Defend But Not To Give Up The Proceedings 
Attendance at the defense of antidumping proceeding is very important for winning 
the lawsuits. When faced antidumping charges, some defendants such as Chinese 
exporters often choose not to respond. 
"The reasons come from several aspects such as cultural aver 1011 to litigation , 
unfamiliarity with the antidumping proceedings. the concerns of legal costs. the 
burdensome questionnaires, and confidentiality of information."
200 Moreover, Some 
enterprises are scared off by the possible prolonged proceedings .2°
1 
And yet under current WTO jurisprudence and structure, to some extent, defendant's 
silence likely means confessing to dumping. They will be direct victims of 
antidumping actions. 
Therefore, active defense is always required in the antidumping lawsuits . In order to 
better response, the export country's governments should provide efficient 
antidumping-related legal and admini trative service to the domestic producers and 
199 Jason z. Yin, Ling Li Antidumping War and Northeast Asian Economies ( NEAE): Issues and 
Strategic Options (PH.D Research Paper Department of Management Hong Kong Polytechnic 
University, 2002) 
200 z. Yin& Ling Li,above. 
201 z. Yin& Ling Li,above. 
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'lQ'l 
exporters.- - The government should set up proper system such as early warning 
system and quicker response system to help the enterprises better cope with the 
antidumping charges. 
C Exporters: To Cooperate But Not To Fight Alone 
The accused exporters can cooperate with the entire domestic like producers and the 
importers to fight together against the antidumping charges. This not only reduces the 
legal cost for each individual party, but also can obtain more useful suggestions and 
wise information. In addition, this paper suggested that various industries could set up 
different non-governmental trade associations, which is composed of professional 
experts in charge of the antidumping lawsuits, in addition to the manufacturers or 
exporters themselves.203 "These trade associations or their counsels keep a close 
contact with the investigating authorities in the importing country, answer questions 
and contest their legal positions or procedural defect. 20.i The functions of the trade 
association could be further institutionalized and expanded. 
D WTO Members: Reform Of Antidumping Agreements. 
" ... it is often seems that just when developing countries begin to efficiently operate and 
become more competitive in a particular markets, industrialized countries shut down tho e 
precise markets ... "205 
As mentioned above, in practice, antidumping laws fail to further their objectives. In 
202 z. Yin& Ling Li,above. 
203 Dongsheng ZANG, S.J.D. Candidate "Seeking Transparency in Antidumping Actions through 
Procedural Review: The GATT/WTO Jurisprudence and Its Implications for China" (Conference on 
China and the World Trade Organization, Australia, I 6- l 7March, 200 I) 
204 ZANG, S.J.D., above. 
205 This is said by Thomas Prusa in the article "On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping" (NBER 
Working Paper 7404, NBER). Thomas Prusa is an economist of Rutgers. 
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their current format, a growing tendency of antidumping turns out to be a policy of 
anti-competition against developing economies. 
The developing countries' governments should actively promote and participate in the 
Antidumping Agreement reform to eliminate its negative effect. This paper suggests 
the following changes:206 
First of all, the Antidumping Agreement should give a uniform standardised 
questionnaire, which merely asks for the certain necessary information to conclude 
the investigation. This questionnaire should be universally applied among all the 
WTO members. 
Following that, unfair antidumping investigations should be eliminated. A stricter 
examination of injury will be conducted before an investigation is initiated. Moreover, 
the injury determination should be individually different, based on enterprise's kind 
and size. "It should also have a necessary regulation in respect with considering the 
influence of factors, such as price range in normal business conduct, quality 
d'ff d h fl . ,,?07 1 erence, an exc ange rate uctuat1on. -
Then, the transparency standard should be further improved. It should be ruled clearly 
that before provisional or final determination is ordered, the interested parties should 
be notified and given sufficient time to defend their interests. 
Finally, duration of the final measures should be reduced. The present maximum 
duration is five years, which does not consider technological developments and the 
cycle of many products . "For example, many IT-products are out-of-date after two 
206 European Commerce PROPOSALS FOR A REFORM OF THE wro ANTI- D UMPING AGREEMENT 
(submission lO International Trade Commerce 200 I) 
207 European Commerce PROPOSALS FOR A REFORM OF TI/£ wro ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT 
(submission to International Trade Commerce 2001) 
ear Therefore. the proposed duration could be decrea ed to t\\ o or three ) ear . 
In conclusion. it should be expected that every indi\ idual tate. a one intere ted part). 
could bring dO\ n national barriers and promote establi hing a ju tified and freedom 
international trading relationship 
208 < http://www.cato.org/new/12-02/l 2- l J-02r. html>(last accessed 20 ovember 03) 
60 
REFERENCES 
International Agreement 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
Agreement On Implementation Of Article VI of General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 (WTO Antidumping Agreement) 
U.S.-China WTO Accession Agreement 2000 
Laws 
Chinese Antidumping Law 2001 
Regulations 
Dumping Prevention , and Offset Tariff Regulations 1997 
Cases 
J.S. STONE, INC v THE UNITED STATES (2003) 147 US 
SHAKEPROOF ASSEMBLY COMPONENTS DIVISION OF ILLINOIS TOOL 
WORKS, INC. v THE UNITED STATES (2000) 97 US. 
Huaiyin Foreign Trade Corp. (30) v. United States DOC, (2002) US 
Orders 
Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation ; Sebacic Acid from the 
People '.s Republic of China, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,339 
Antidumping Duty Order: Sebacic Acid from the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), 
61 
59 Fed. Reg. 35,909 
Texts 
Grossman G.M. Strategic Trade Policies and the New International Economics (1 ed
, 
MIT Cambridge, 1986) 
Mah, Jai S. The United States' Antidumping Decisions against the Northeast As
ian 
Dynamic Economies (Blackwell, US, 2000) 
Articles 
Michael 0. Moore Antidumping Reform in the United States A Faded Sunset 
Gary N.Horlick & Eleanor C. Shea The World Trade Organization Antidumping 
Agreement 
Lei Yu RULE OF I.AW OR RULE OF PROTECTIONISM: ANTI-DUMPI
NG 
PRACTICES TOWARD CHINA AND THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
 
Jason Z. Yin, Ling Li Antidumping War and Northeast Asian Econom
ies 
(NEAE):lssues and Strategic Options 
William Loehr Dumping and Anti-Dumping Policywith Applications in Lithuania 
Dongsheng ZANG & S.J.D. Candidate Seeking Transparency in Antidumping Acti
ons 
through Procedural Review: The GATT!WTO Jurisprudence and Its Implications
 for 
China 
Han Guojian China Learns How to Deal With Dumping Charges 
Alford, William P. When Is China Paraguay ? An examination of the Application of the
 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and O
ther 
'Non-market Economy' Nations 
Ross, Lester & Ning, Susan Modern Protectionism: China's Own Antidump
ing 
Regulations 
Hong Kong Trade Development Council Commission proposal to maintain 
the 
current special anti-dumping regime for China 
62 
adeem M. Firoz & Ramon E. GarcfaAntidumping War against China and the Effect of 
WTO Membership 
Perry. William E. U.S. Antidumping Cases Against China-Lessons Learned 
Greg Mastel The Sunset Review is Being Turned on Its Head 
Xiang Liu &Hylke Vandenbussche EU Anridumping Cases Against China: An 
Overview and Future Prospects With Respect To China 's WTO Membership 
Leonard K. Cheng China's Accession to the World Trade Organi-::,ation and It Effects 
on the Chinese and Hong Kong Economies 
John Magnu & Dewey Ballantine Chinas Antidumping La11·s and Regularions: Wizar 
do they say? How do they affect U.S. exports? Are they consisrent ll'itlz WTO 
Agreement? 
European Commerce PROPOSALS FOR ,-\ REFORM OF Tf/E WTO A Tl-DUAf PI G 
AGREEMENT 
China Daily Hong Kong (16 September 2003) 
People's Daily Beijing (14 ovember 2003) 
Qiao Bao Hong Kong (15-21 February 2002) 
Electronic materials 
<http://www.sis-verlag.de/031027/stel/DUMP _ WH.HTM> 
<http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAIJ52-l-33.htm> 
<C:\Documents and Settings\Harvey Norman\Desktop\no1mal value.htm> 
<http://www.med.govt.nz/buslt/t:rade_rern/glossary/> 
< http://www.ejil.org/joumal/curdevs/srl5.rtf > 
< http://www.cid.harvard.edu/caer2/htrn/content/papers/paper 11/paper l l .htm#22 > 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/w hatis_e/eol/e/wto04/wto4 _ l 9. htm> 
<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200309/ l 4/eng200309 l 4_124248.shtml> 
<C:\Documents and Settings\Harvey Norman\Desktop\antidumping l\U.S. 
Antidumping Cases Against China - Lessons Leamed.htm> 
<http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/fED/craychin.htm> 
6 
<http://\\\\\\ .google . o.nzJ ar'h '~q= rh : IQKHXdmK ~J:\\\\\\ . 'Oil. ukmen.1 · 
be/te\\/academ1 ', a count/memberJH\ Ike T\TER~. Tl _ ·. Le-(_: 20Pl'BUC .\TIO.· 
S/E -CHI N 'F2520JCLYrr_-20_QQ2\'ER JE_ •c_--BI •c_:5D. +c- _2\\IPn fo 
reign+ ounrrie -+take+di riminat 1;, +anti-dumping a ' ti n+again:t hines' produc 
ts.+China+can+take+retaliation+a tion <'1r _2 ·hi= n •' tart= lc'ie=l TF-8> 
< http://W\\w.cato.org/ne\\ / 12-02/ l _- l l-02r. html> 
64 
cAVV LIBRARY 
A Fine According to Library 
Regulations is charged on 
Overdue Books. 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 
WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
C518 
2003 

